{"id":4213,"date":"2026-08-24T14:58:56","date_gmt":"2026-08-24T14:58:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.himnus.com\/?p=4213"},"modified":"2026-08-24T14:59:00","modified_gmt":"2026-08-24T14:59:00","slug":"fifa-reform-transfer-system-rst-2027","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.himnus.com\/en\/fifa-reform-transfer-system-rst-2027\/","title":{"rendered":"The reform of the RSTP 2027: this is how the FIFA transfer system changes after the Diarra case"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

For more than twenty years, much of the international system of player transfers has been built around a seemingly simple idea: contracts must be fulfilled and whoever breaks them without a justifying cause must bear the consequences. Article 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP)<\/a> was articulated on this premise, probably one of the provisions that has generated a significant body of case law, controversies and legal literature in modern professional football.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The problem is that, with the passage of time, that simple idea ended up surrounded by a system that, at times, generated problems. The breach or termination of contract could trigger compensation that is difficult to foresee, joint and several liability for the new club, presumptions of inducement, sporting sanctions and even difficulties related to the international registration of the player. That framework was intended to protect contractual stability, but it could also have a much more problematic effect: that a club interested in signing a player involved in a dispute with his former employer decided not to do so simply to avoid the legal risks associated with the transaction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That was, to a large extent, one of the major problems highlighted by the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 4 October 2024 in the so-called Diarra case (case C-650\/22).<\/a> The Court did not limit itself to discussing how much a footballer who unilaterally broke his contract should pay, but questioned the combination of rules capable of making it difficult for him to be recruited and, therefore, restricting his professional mobility even before it had been definitively determined who was right in the contractual dispute.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FIFA reacted first through an interim framework applicable from January 2025<\/a> and then with a structural reform approved on 10 June 2026 that will enter into force on 1 January 2027, which will be the subject of this analysis. And we are not talking about a minor adjustment. The amendment covers the RSTP itself,<\/a> the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal<\/a>,  the Disciplinary Code<\/a> and the FIFA Governance Regulations<\/a>. It changes the calculation of compensation, the liability of the new club, the protected period, sporting sanctions, the International Transfer Certificate (ITC) procedure, the contracts with minors, the economic participation of players in their own transfers and even the way in which FIFA intends to modify its rules in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If we had to find a common thread for the whole reform, it would probably be that FIFA is trying to replace a good part of the automatic mechanisms of the old system with criteria of proportionality without renouncing, for that reason, contractual stability or the international transfer market itself. And it is precisely in this balance that both the main advances of the RSTP 2027 and some of the doubts that will probably occupy the Football Tribunal and the CAS for the next few years are found.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. From unilateral regulation to negotiation: the new global social dialogue<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
      <\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      One of the most relevant novelties of the reform is not in compensation, a sanction or a deadline, but in something previous: who participates in the elaboration of the rules. Historically, the RSTP has been a private rule issued by FIFA in the exercise of its regulatory capacity over international football. A Swiss private law association lays down rules that condition employment contracts concluded between clubs and players practically anywhere in the world and also has its own bodies to resolve a large part of the disputes arising from those same rules. The construction may be legally peculiar, but it has been in operation for decades and constitutes one of the main singularities of international sports law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The RSTP 2027 introduces, however, an important conceptual modification. The new Article 1 presents the Regulations as the result of a joint agreement between representatives of workers \u2013 players and unions \u2013 and employers \u2013 clubs and leagues \u2013 reached through a process of social dialogue promoted by FIFA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      This process is institutionalised through the so-called Global Social Dialogue Platform for Professional Football<\/em><\/a>, in which FIFA, FIFPRO, European Football Clubs (EFC) and the World Leagues Association (WLA) participate. Except for certain matters, FIFA also undertakes not to amend the RSTP in the future without agreement between the social partners and the organisation itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Change has an obvious institutional value. For the first time, FIFA expressly recognises that rules that so intensely affect the mobility, contractual stability, remuneration and working conditions of footballers should not be built solely through a unilateral decision by the regulator. FIFA itself has even presented this new framework as the seed of a true international collective agreement for professional football.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The expression is suggestive, but perhaps it should be used with some caution. A traditional collective agreement is based on trade unions and employers’ organisations whose representativeness is recognised within a given legal system, is negotiated in accordance with previously established procedures and has regulatory effects that are also defined by national legislation. The RSTP remains, on the other hand, a private FIFA rule that must be projected simultaneously over a multitude of different labour laws. For this reason, it seems more accurate to speak, at least for now, of a hybrid formula between international federative regulation and transnational collective bargaining.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      That does not detract from the importance of progress. On the contrary, it introduces a degree of negotiated legitimacy that the traditional system did not have. The real test will come when major disagreements appear among the participants. Reaching a consensus after a ruling that requires certain rules to be reformed is one thing; Doing so when the economic interests of players, big clubs and leagues from different regions of the world conflict can be much more complicated. It will be then that we will see if this Platform works as a true global negotiating table or if it ends up being, fundamentally, an instrument to reinforce the legitimacy of the regulation promoted by FIFA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      2. The real heart of the reform: the new Article 17 of the RSTP<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        <\/ol>\n\n\n\n

        If institutional reform is important, the transformation of Article 17 is even more so. The provision expands from five to fourteen paragraphs and even changes its name: it stops referring to the “consequences of termination without just cause”<\/em> to regulate the “consequences of breach of contract”.<\/em> The terminological modification anticipates the change of approach. We are no longer dealing with a relatively brief provision that includes some economic and sporting consequences of a unilateral breach, but rather a true system that determines what the parties can agree on, how the damage is calculated, what minimum compensation corresponds, what effects abusive behaviour has, when the new club responds and what sporting sanctions can be imposed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        To a large extent, FIFA has incorporated into the Regulations themselves principles that for years had to be built through the case law of the Football Tribunal and the CAS. That should increase the predictability of the system, although the codification of those criteria does not mean that litigation disappears. Rather, the questions to be resolved by decision-making bodies will change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          \n
        • The agreed compensation: more contractual autonomy, but not unlimited<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

          The first rule of the new Article 17 is relatively intuitive: if the club and the player have agreed in advance what the economic consequences of a breach will be, that agreement is the starting point. This type of clause was already common in contractual practice, but FIFA now expressly regulates them and also clarifies that they do not have to be reciprocal. Club and player may establish different consequences depending on who breaches, provided that the agreement exceeds the limits established by the Regulations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          These limits are expected to be a major source of litigation. The Football Tribunal may moderate an award where it is excessively high and may disapply the clause where it is manifestly unfair. The distinction is important: an excessive clause remains valid even though it can be reduced; a manifestly unjust one can be directly displaced. Determining where one category ends and the other begins will require analyzing the circumstances of each contract, the negotiating power of the parties, the remaining duration, the economic value of the relationship, and the true purpose of the clause.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          In other words, the reform recognises contractual autonomy more clearly, but prevents an apparently compensatory clause from becoming a mechanism designed to make it practically impossible for one of the parties to leave the relationship. For certain players, there is also enhanced protection: where their annual fixed remuneration does not exceed USD 150,000, the compensation agreed in their favour must, as a general rule, guarantee at least the residual value of the contract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            \n
          • When there is no agreement: the economic evidence becomes the center of the litigation<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

            The issue becomes much more complex when the contract does not previously determine the compensation. In such cases, the new Article 17 (ex. point 2) is based on the principle that the injured party must receive full compensation for the damage caused by the breach, but expressly distinguishes between the damage that players and clubs may suffer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            When the claimant is the player, special account must be taken of the residual value of the contract and any other proven damage (ex. article 17.3 of the RSTP). For clubs, on the other hand, the Regulation introduces categories closely linked to the economic reality of professional football: the value of the player’s services, the loss of possible compensation or transfer value, replacement costs and any other damage actually suffered (ex. Article 17.4 of the RSTP).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            This incorporation is relevant because it formalizes concepts that for years were the subject of discussion before FIFA and CAS, but it also profoundly modifies the way in which these claims should be prepared. Over a drink, it can be said quite easily that a player is “worth ten million<\/em>“. However, in legal proceedings, that assertion will have to be proven. If a club maintains that the breach of contract caused it to lose a future transfer, it must prove the existence of offers, real negotiations, interest from other clubs, comparable operations or any element that allows a theoretical valuation to be transformed into demonstrable economic damage. The same will happen with replacement costs, the investment pending amortization or the value of the sporting services that were no longer received.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Therefore, although the reform provides more criteria, it will not necessarily make litigation easier. Just the opposite may happen: economic evidence will take on a much greater role, with expert reports<\/strong> , market comparables, financial documentation and evidence on negotiations that could previously occupy a secondary role. The new Article 17 provides a clearer catalogue of what can be claimed; The difficulty will be in demonstrating how much each concept is really worth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              \n
            • Residual value as a minimum: legal certainty versus effective reparation<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

              One of the most significant modifications consists of converting the residual value of the contract into a real compensation floor. As a general rule, both player and club must receive at least an amount equivalent to the residual value of the breached contract, and only extraordinary circumstances will allow them to be below that threshold (ex. article 17.5 RSTP).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              The duty to mitigate the damage continues to exist. A person who suffers a breach must take reasonable measures to limit his or her damages, but such mitigation can no longer be automatically used to reduce compensation below the residual value (e.g. Article 17.7 RSTP). Think, for example, of a player whose contract is terminated without just cause who quickly finds a new club and begins to receive a similar salary. From a purely compensatory conception, it could be asked what their actual economic loss is; under the new RSTP, however, the residual value generally retains its function as a minimum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              The solution provides predictability and reinforces the protection of the injured party, although it also opens up an interesting conceptual question: if compensation can be maintained above the economic damage that finally subsists after mitigation, are we only dealing with reparation for the damage or do we also use compensation as an instrument to protect contractual stability? It is likely that the intention of this new Article 17 combines both functions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              And there a historical tension of the system reappears. Clubs need stability to plan squads, make investments and develop sports projects, but that stability cannot turn the employment contract into an indirect form of worker retention either. Finding a balance between these two needs has been one of the great problems of the system since Bosman and continues to be so after Diarra.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              An additional penalty of up to six months\u2019 salary is added to this new architecture when there is abusive conduct (ex. article 17.6 RSTP). Unlike ordinary compensation, this figure incorporates a clearly punitive component: it is not limited to assessing how much money the injured party lost, but also how the person who failed to comply behaved. Pressures, coercive actions or strategies contrary to good faith may generate an economic consequence of their own, applicable to both clubs and players.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                \n
              • The liability of the new club: the big change caused by Diarra<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                The reform of the liability of the new club is probably the modification most directly linked to the Diarra judgment. Under the previous system, hiring a player who had broken his contract could expose the new club to joint and several liability and sporting sanctions, generating an obvious incentive to avoid the operation, even if the eventual employer had not participated in the breach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                From 2027, the starting point will be different. The new club will only be jointly liable with the player when it can be established that the new club induced the breach, and such inducement must be proven on the basis of the circumstances of the case according to the standard of preponderance or balance of probabilities. In simple terms, it must be more likely that the new club caused or favoured the breach than the opposite (ex. article 17.9 RSTP).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                The solution clearly seems more consistent with the objections raised by the CJEU, but it contains an element that deserves attention. If the footballer signs with a new club within 45 days of the breach of his previous contract, the RSTP establishes a presumption of inducement. The presumption can be destroyed \u2013 under the evidentiary standard of “comfortable satisfaction” \u2013<\/em> but it will then be the new club who must provide sufficient elements to prove that it did not intervene in the player’s decision (ex. article 17.11 RSTP).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                The reform therefore eliminates the old general automatic mechanism but does not completely eliminate the legal risk during those first weeks. Any entity that hires a player within that period will know that an eventual litigation can start from a more uncomfortable evidentiary position. And it is inevitable to wonder to what extent this mechanism will continue to produce a certain deterrent effect on the labour market, precisely one of the central concerns of the Diarra case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                The difference with the previous system is, in any case, important. It will no longer be enough to hire the player to respond automatically, but the timeline of the operation will be of enormous value. When the first contact took place, who took the initiative, what role the agent played, what information the new club had about the previous relationship or what advice the player received before the end of the contract will be matters that will need to be documented with particular care. The reform reduces automatism, but makes the traceability of negotiations an essential legal tool to which clubs will have to pay special attention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  \n
                • Sports sanctions and protected period: more proportionality, although all doubts do not disappear<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                  The new logic is also seen in sports sanctions. For clubs, the scheme that could lead directly to a ban on registration for two consecutive periods in the event of a breach occurring within the protected period disappears and a progressive system based on repeated breaches for two years is introduced (ex. article 17.10 RSTP). The first breach will result in a warning and fine; the second will limit the incorporation of new players; the third may cause a complete ban for one registration period and the fourth for two consecutive periods. The existence of aggravating circumstances will allow the Tribunal to impose more serious sanctions directly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  The exception is again induction. If a new club has caused the player’s contractual breach during the protected period, FIFA retains a particularly severe response and allows a ban on registration to be imposed directly for two full periods. The reform thus distinguishes between an isolated breach and conduct actively aimed at breaking the contractual stability of another entity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  In footballers, on the other hand, the architecture changes much less: anyone who fails to comply within the protected period may continue to be sanctioned with four months of disqualification from playing official matches, extendable to six when aggravating circumstances occur (ex. article 17.12 RSTP). The great proportionalisation of the sanctioning system is therefore mainly concentrated in the clubs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  The protected period itself is also redefined. Compared to the old scheme focused on the age-28 threshold, the RSTP 2027 establishes four brackets (ex. point 7 RSTP definitions): (i) up to four seasons or years for contracts signed before the age of 23; (ii) three between 23 and 28; (iii) two between the ages of 28 and 32 and (iv) one from the age of 32. In addition, the renewal or extension of the contract restarts the corresponding period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  The logic aims to link the degree of protection to the age of the player and, by extension, to the investment risk assumed by the club. The system smooths out the sharp jump that previously occurred at age 28, although it does not completely eliminate the problems of setting rigid boundaries. There is still a significant difference between signing immediately before or after turning 23, 28 or 32 and, especially in this last stretch, it is worth asking whether a single year of protection is always enough for veteran footballers who maintain an important sporting value and sign multi-year contracts. The measure facilitates their mobility, but shifts a greater part of the contractual risk to the club. As with much of the reform, proportionality will also depend on the perspective from which it is observed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  3. More protection against abusive behaviour<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    <\/ol>\n\n\n\n

                    Contractual stability cannot only protect the club against the player’s breach. It also requires preventing the employer himself from transforming the employment relationship into an unbearable situation with the aim of forcing an exit. The so-called football mobbing<\/em> is not a new phenomenon: players removed from training, threats linked to their registration, professional demotions or pressure aimed at obtaining a salary reduction or termination have been the subject of numerous proceedings before FIFA and the CAS.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The new article 14.3 attempts to provide greater clarity and expressly identifies four examples of abusive conduct: (i) using the registration or withdrawal of the player as a pressure mechanism, (ii) abusively separating him from training with the team, (iii) withholding his passport and (iv) improperly expelling him from the housing provided by the club. Codification improves predictability, but it doesn’t turn these assumptions into four automatic causes of termination. Expressions such as “abusive”,<\/em> “as a measure of pressure”<\/em> or “unduly”<\/em> will force the specific context to be assessed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Not every separation of training will be illicit. It can respond to perfectly legitimate medical, disciplinary or sporting reasons. The problem will be to differentiate a true technical decision from a strategy aimed at wearing down the player until he is forced to leave. For this reason, evidence once again has a decisive role: clubs and players must preserve communications, registration decisions, schedules, medical or disciplinary reports and any element that allows the real cause of the measures adopted to be reconstructed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The RSTP 2027 offers more references than its predecessor, but it does not replace the analysis of each case. And that may be the only reasonable solution in an area where the same conduct \u2013 training separately for several weeks, for example \u2013 may be perfectly legitimate in one case and clearly abusive in another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    4. The annual fixed remuneration and the new right to participate in the transfer<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Another apparently technical novelty, but with important practical consequences, is the definition of annual fixed remuneration (ex. point 44 definitions of the RSTP). The concept now refers to the gross fixed remuneration corresponding to each contractual year before taxes and mandatory deductions, but what is really relevant is how certain payments will be allocated. Signing-on fees<\/em> will be distributed proportionately over the entire duration of the contract, while certain loyalty bonuses and other periodic payments will be allocated to the year in which they are due.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The purpose is clearly anti-avoidance. If certain protections depend on the player being below an economic threshold, it would not make sense to allow a higher remuneration to be artificially structured by a reduced fixed salary accompanied by a huge signing bonus. From 2027 onwards, therefore, it will be necessary to pay attention not only to how much the player earns, but also to how his remuneration as a whole is structured.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    This new definition makes special sense when analysing one of the most striking novelties of the RSTP 2027: the new article 21bis on the player’s participation in the price of his own transfer. Traditionally, the footballer has occupied a peculiar position within these operations. His consent is essential and its sporting value justifies the payment of significant amounts between clubs, but the price of the transfer has been distributed mainly between these entities without the player having, by the mere fact of the transfer, an economic right of his own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The reform partially changes that logic. In certain permanent international transfers, players whose annual fixed remuneration at the former club is below EUR 150.000 are generally entitled to receive 5% of the fixed transfer compensation actually received directly from the selling club. A partial waiver is permitted, although subject to limits to prevent the right from being completely devoid of content, and the rule provides for exceptions where there is national legislation, collective bargaining or an equivalent domestic system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Beyond the figures, Article 21bis has an important conceptual value. FIFA recognises that the footballer is not simply the subject whose contract and registration allow the transfer to be carried out, but can also be a direct participant in the economic value generated by the transaction. That idea connects with one of the substantive debates opened by Diarra. The new RSTP seems to assume in a more transparent way that the transfer constitutes an economic reality typical of professional football, connected to the employment contract, but not identical to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    It will be necessary to analyse how it applies to certain complex structures, what happens in some cases linked to release clauses or how a fixed threshold of 150,000 euros will evolve if wages continue to increase over the next few years. But the change in philosophy is evident: for the first time, FIFA is introducing a mechanism that allows certain players to share in the price generated by their own change of club.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The solution, by the way, is not completely strange from the Spanish perspective: Article 13.a) of Royal Decree 1006\/1985 has already recognized for decades the participation of the professional athlete in the price of certain transfers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    5.<\/strong> Five-year contracts with minors: more protection for the academy, with conditions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Another modification that is likely to attract attention is the possibility of signing contracts of up to five years with certain players under the age of 18. Until now, the general rule prevented exceeding three years. From 2027 there will be an exception for players who have previously been registered with the club for at least 20 months or two consecutive competition periods, whichever is shorter (ex. article 18.2 RSTP).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The purpose is clear: to allow clubs that have really invested in the training of the player to protect certain talents for longer. It is not, therefore, a question of opening the door to recruiting a minor and linking him immediately for five years. In addition, the exception cannot be used indiscriminately, as each club will have a maximum of five new contracts of these characteristics per season.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The longer duration does not come for free for the club either. The Regulations require minimum salary increases during the fourth and fifth year and contemplate additional increases linked to the player’s participation with the first team. A kind of regulatory exchange is thus configured: the club obtains more stability and, in exchange, the player receives economic guarantees that accompany his sporting progression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    In this area, special attention will also have to be paid to domestic law. The possibility recognised by FIFA cannot be applied where national legislation or a valid collective agreement prevents contracts of that duration. Especially in the case of minors, the RSTP continues to need to be read in conjunction with the labour and protection standards applicable in each country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    6. The ITC ceases to be a tool of economic pressure<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Another of Diarra’s most direct consequences appears in the International Transfer Certificate procedure. The philosophy of the new regime can be summed up in one idea: an economic dispute should not prevent the player from being registered and being able to continue exercising his profession.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The previous association may state that the former club has claims against the player or against the new club, but this reservation will not affect his registration or prejudge the outcome of the subsequent contractual dispute. Two levels are definitively separated that should not be confused: if there is a debt or a default, it is claimed before the competent body; meanwhile, the ITC administrative procedure cannot be used as a tool to block the player.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The reform also sets a clear deadline for processing and allows FIFA to authorise, in exceptional circumstances, an urgent registration within a single working day when necessary to avoid irreparable damage. The concept will have to be clarified through practice, but the principle that inspires the modification is difficult to dispute: an economic dispute cannot indirectly become a prohibition on work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    7.<\/strong> How litigation before FIFA will change<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The reform also modifies some procedural rules that, despite receiving less public attention, can have a huge practical impact. One of the most relevant concerns the law applied by the Football Tribunal. From 2027 the hierarchy will be clearer: FIFA regulations will be applied first and, subsidiarily, Swiss law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The move seeks to bring uniformity to an international body that resolves disputes from multiple jurisdictions. However, it should not be interpreted as the disappearance of national law. Mandatory labour standards continue to be relevant before the state courts, collective agreements may prevail in certain matters expressly contemplated by the RSTP and the Regulation itself continues to refer on several points to domestic legislation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    FIFA therefore strengthens the autonomy of its legal system and uses Swiss law to fill its gaps. It is a functional solution from the perspective of predictability, although it is not without a certain paradox: a regulation that aims to serve as an overall labour framework reduces general references to the different national systems and adopts as a subsidiary reference the law of a single country. The tension between international uniformity and national labour standards will continue to exist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Added to this is an economically simpler change: the standard default interest goes from the 5% traditionally applied by the Football Tribunal to 8% per annum (ex. article 23.5 RSTP). It will be necessary to expressly request it, any valid rate agreed by the parties will generally prevail and the Court may reduce it in exceptional circumstances. It may seem like a secondary modification compared to the restructuring of Article 17, but it will have very specific consequences in high-value claims and should lead clubs, players and agents to pay greater attention to the interest clauses in their contracts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The enforcement of decisions taken at the national level is also strengthened. When a resolution has been issued by a National Dispute Resolution Chamber recognized by FIFA and the competent association does not enforce it, the Disciplinary Committee may automatically assume its execution and the national association may be fined for its non-execution (ex. article 21.6 of the Disciplinary Code). It is an important step forward to prevent a favorable resolution from being useless due to the passivity of an association, although its initial impact will depend on something quite obvious: it will only work with respect to the NDRC officially recognized by FIFA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    8. The reform also applies to coaches<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Although players are understandably at the centre of the reform, the RSTP 2027 also introduces relevant modifications for coaches through its Annex 2. Some of the new rules on just cause and agreed compensation are transferred to their contractual relations, partially approximating both regimes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The alignment, however, is not complete. The coach does not occupy the same economic position within the transfer system and this difference continues to be reflected, among other issues, in the rules relating to the calculation and mitigation of certain compensations. FIFA aims to increase coherence between the two groups without ignoring the fact that the economic risks associated with the termination of a coaching contract are not exactly the same as those associated with a footballer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    9. Beware of the transitional regime: not everything changes on January 1<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    After analysing the main developments, a question probably less attractive, but essential in practice, arises: determining which contracts and disputes each one actually applies to. The general entry into force is set for 1 January 2027, but that does not mean that any proceedings initiated after that date will automatically be subject to the new RSTP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    In general, it will be necessary to take into account the time when the events that gave rise to the dispute occurred. In addition, some provisions have specific transitional rules linked to contracts entered into under the new framework, such as the agreed compensatory clauses, the player’s participation in the transfer price or the new regime of long contracts with minors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    For several years, therefore, contracts and disputes subject to different versions of the Regulation will coexist. Two very similar situations may be treated differently simply because the contracts or relevant events occurred on either side of the effective date. It is not an anomaly, but the inevitable consequence of a reform of this depth. For legal practitioners, it also leaves a fairly simple warning: before discussing what the new Article 17 establishes, it will be necessary to check which version of Article 17 is really applicable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    10. Has FIFA really solved Diarra’s problem?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      <\/ol>\n\n\n\n

                      After all of the above, it would be relatively easy to conclude that FIFA has resolved the objections raised in the Diarra case. It has eliminated automatic joint and several liability, separated the ITC from economic claims, created a more gradual sanctioning system, specified the compensation criteria, recognized new economic rights to players and incorporated social dialogue mechanisms in the production of regulations. The RSTP 2027 is, in many respects, a more sophisticated, predictable and proportionate framework than the previous one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      However, perhaps the most interesting question is not only whether FIFA has changed the rules questioned by the CJEU, but whether it has also modified the legal justification on which the transfer system rests. For decades, much of the Article 17 architecture attempted to connect the price of the transfer with the stability of the employment contract. Diarra placed particular strain on that legal construction because the salary that the player receives for his services and the price that two clubs agree between them for a transfer respond to different economic logics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      The new RSTP seems to recognize this difference more naturally. It allows compensation to be agreed without necessarily reducing it to a salary formula, admits among the club’s damages concepts related to the economic value of the player and a possible transfer and, above all, creates article 21bis, through which the player can participate directly in that price. In a way, FIFA seems to accept more openly that the transfer system is an economic institution of professional football and cannot be explained solely by the ordinary rules for the termination of an employment contract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      This does not place the system outside of Labour Law or, much less, of European Union Law. What changes is the terrain on which the next debate is likely to take place. The question will not only be whether a certain concept can be considered a loss arising from the breach of contract, but to what extent a specific transfer system, with its economic, sporting and redistributive functions, constitutes a legitimate and proportionate restriction within a professional market as unique as football.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      In a necessarily preliminary assessment \u2013 and before we know how the first disputes will be resolved\u2013 the RSTP 2027 represents one of the most important transformations of the international transfer system since the great post-Bosman reform. It would be unfair to reduce it to a mere defensive reaction to the Court of Justice. There are important advances: signing a player involved in a dispute no longer automatically exposes the new club to liability; sanctions become more gradual; the ITC ceases to function as a potential instrument of economic pressure; abusive behaviors are better specified; training clubs receive new tools to protect their youth academy; certain players will participate directly in the value of their transfers and FIFA introduces a rule-making model that is more open to its social partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      But the reform does not eliminate the structural tension that has always accompanied the football market. Clubs need contractual stability because they invest, plan and assume economic risks; Footballers need mobility because, before sporting assets, they are workers; and FIFA intends to preserve a system of transfers to which it attributes its own economic and redistributive functions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      That is why the new regulation resolves some issues and opens up others.  A broader question will continue to hover over all of them: is the RSTP 2027 the proportionate system that Diarra demanded or a more legally sophisticated reconstruction of the same model of transfers?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      The answer will not appear in the circular announcing the reform. It will be built by the first conflicts, the decisions of the Football Tribunal, the case law of the CAS and, probably, further court rulings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Diarra forced FIFA to change the rules. The 2027 RSTP is FIFA\u2019s response. Now we need to see how it works when these rules move from paper to practice and begin to be applied to the real market.

                      Abel Gunt\u00edn
                      Associate<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                      For more than twenty years, much of the international system of player transfers has been built around a seemingly simple idea: contracts must be fulfilled and whoever breaks them without a justifying cause must bear the consequences. 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